# Protocol Fees

## Stargate Transaction Fees

Each non-STG transfer through the Stargate protocol will incur a 6 bps fee. Here's the fee allocation breakdown of the transaction fee:&#x20;

* **Protocol Treasury:** 4 bps
* **veSTG Holders:** 1 bp
* **Liquidity Providers:** 1 bp
  * If there are emissions on the source pool for a transfer, this fee is reverted to the protocol.

This fee structure was voted on in [SIP: Value Accrual for STG Stakers](https://snapshot.org/#/stgdao.eth/proposal/0x69c00cffab20a897469c4bdb04524dc6b31a167b3c0b11e5bea1269ae4ce9043)

#### Stargate Whitelist Partner Program

Partners that integrate Stargate in production and have **significant transaction volume** can apply to participate in Stargate's whitelist partner program. Reach out to Stargate!

Partners will receive .3 bps for the transactions they've sent through the Stargate protocol. These will be settled in stablecoin on a monthly basis. The .3 bps will come from the Treasury's baseline fee.

## Stargate Rebalancing Fees

As one of the key features of Stargate is Instant Guaranteed Finality (IGF) using native assets, Stargate's performance needs destination chains to maintain sufficient reserve balances at hand to facilitate incoming swap transactions.

The protocol's initial stage starts with balances at the ideal target balance, but subsequent swap transactions will have the effect of draining some balances on destination chains while increasing others on source chains.

To incentivize users to conduct swaps that "refill" native asset balances and deter users from engaging in transactions that could drain the reserve balance completely, Stargate implements rebalancing fees that depend on any potential transaction's current balance and transaction size.&#x20;

In particular, the marginal rebalancing fee function $$f(b,B,t)$$as a function of the current balance $$b$$, the target balance $$B$$, and the transaction size $$t$$ is as follows, conditional upon the post-transaction balance $$B-t$$ as follows:

| Marginal Fee f(b,B,t)                                     | Condition                            |
| --------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------ |
| 0                                                         | $$b-t\geq \delta_1 B$$​              |
| $$\frac{\lambda_1}{(\delta_1-\delta_2)B}(\delta_1B-b+t)$$ | $$\delta_2 B \leq b-t < \delta_1 B$$ |
| $$\lambda_1+\frac{\lambda_2}{\delta_2B}(\delta_2B-b+t)$$  | $$b-t < \delta_2 B$$​                |

Here, we have set the marginal rebalancing fee hyperparameters as follows:

| Hyperparameter | Value  |
| -------------- | ------ |
| $$\lambda_1$$  | 40bps  |
| $$\lambda_2$$  | 99.54% |
| $$\delta_1$$   | 60%    |
| $$\delta_2$$   | 5%     |

This piece-wise linear marginal rebalancing fee structure would cause the user's observed cumulative fee to be quadratic in $$b$$ and $$t$$.  &#x20;

All rebalancing fees accrued are cumulatively sent to a reward pool that will be disbursed to any user who makes a "refilling" transaction, with the amount disbursed proportionally to how close the post-transaction balance returns to the ideal target balance.  &#x20;

Furthermore, given that the reward pool sees no direct rebalancing fee revenue in the Tier 1 Safe Zone, the protocol Treasury shall subsidize the reward pool in this zone by reallocating a linear share from its 1.5bp protocol transactions fees depending on the distance to the Tier 2 Intermediate Zone up to maximum of 1bps of the fees earned.&#x20;
